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2. Alan Greenspan testified before Congress on January 26, 1995, 'although the speed of transmission of positive economic events has been an important plus for the world in recent years, it is becominq increasingly obvious --and Mexico is the first major case --'that significant mistakes reverberate around the world Reserve Bulletin, March 1995, 3. These parallels are much controversial to be explored they are there and important financial world. 5. These data are compiled on a different basis from those presented in Table 1 and intra alia include 'exceptional financing" some of which comes importantly from the official sector even for the more advanced developing countries. Nevertheless, when the crisis broke, the objective situation was one in which a large number of geographically dispersed investors were caught holding short-term claims on
Mexico that could not be serviced without incurring a massive short-run depreciation of the peso. They realized that their investment strategies had been based on one or more false premises concerning the nature of Mexico's exchange rate regime or the probability that they could liquidate their holdings before any crisis hit. While it is difficult to prove, a third 8. For example, at the end of November, 1994, the 91-day Cetes rate was 15.60 percent, a spread of 988 basis points over the U.S. 3-month Treasury bill rate of 5.72 percent, while the 91-day Tesobono rate was 7.49 for a spread of only 177 basis points. Technically, there was some exchange rate risk originally associated with Tesobonos because their principal was only indexed to the dollar, but it was paid in pesos and the holder had to handle or cover the conversion of the pesos received into dollars. -10 -losses as well, as did holders on other longer-dated Mexican debt instruments such as Brady bonds. Nevertheless, the widespread perception is that portfolio investors in Mexican paper suffered no losses as a consequence of the peso crisis and on the whole were well-rewarded for the limited risks they had taken.
When the crisis erupted, investors panicked, not only investors in the Mexican stock market and in Mexico debt instruments but also investors in similar instruments issued by borrowers in other countries, especially countries in the same part of the world or perceived to be in similar circumstances.
These contagion sales of assets were induced by at least two types of forces. First, as perceived risks rose and expected returns fell, individual investors were induced to disinvest.
Second, institutionalholders such as mutual funds faced with actual or threatened redemptions were led to liquify their holdings not only of Mexican paper but also of the paper of other countries especially if they could do so while limiting their capital losses. These patterns can be seen in the sympathetic movements in the stripped yields on Brady bonds of various countries in Latin America and elsewhere --see Charts 1 and 2.
Whether they deserved it or not, the wealth of Mexico's external creditors as a group was only marginally affected by losses following the crash of the peso. The principal reason was that the investors were numerous and Mexican paper was not a large portion of any final, non-Mexican investor's total portfolio; a secondary reason was that some of the investors benefitted from the actions taken to stave off a larger cris~s. -
-11- 
C. Implications
The Mexican peso crisis of 1994-95 is likely to be unique in at least one respect: in future liquidity crises, holders of large amounts of portfolio claims on the country facing the crisis are much less likely to be made whole as the consequence of official actions that provide financial assistance to the country in question. 12 However, the fundamental point is that the scale of potential financial assistance needed to stave off a full-blown crisis in Mexico has proved to be much larger than anyone could have imagined a year ago, and the scale of any similar operation in the future (even after allowance for the special circumstances surrounding the Mexican case) is likely to be larger than the official sector will be able or willing to Moreover, like it or not, true or false, as noted 12. This implication 1s related, in part, to the discussion in Section III below. They became more hospitable to foreign direct investment by relaxing restrictions, rewriting discriminatory regulations, and reworking the landscape of the public sector through massive privatization programs that, in turn, meant that portfolio investments in equity securities became more attractive. These forces of economic reform led to more flexible economies, economies that in principle were better 13. Again, this implication draws in part on the discussion in Section III below. 14. As noted above, some have argued that this so-called Washington consensus" on policies may have been overblown oõ verinterpreted in terms of its short-term implications for growth.
equipped to respond to shocks. However, they involved two-way risks, at least potentially, because the recipient countries to some extent became more exposed to the risk of a sharp change in investor sentiment. Funds that flowed in and easily financed current account deficits could also easily seek to flow out if conditions or perceptions changed.
This proposition about the increased risk to the recipient country is debatable, and it deserves closer scrutiny than it can receive in the paper. . This is what the aggregate statistics show. Arguably, .ith the increased flexibility and openness of the Mexican economy, the actual investments were more efficient and productive in the 1990s than earlier.
-19 -they are now more open and can more easily do without the capital inflows and adjust to its 10SS with less (not zerot but less) pain --in terms of lost output. On the affirmative side, it might appear that the unforgiving nature of capital markets implies that countries are more susceptible to severe punishment (in terms, again, of lost output) for marginal policy errors; on the other hand, increased market discipline contributes to more 18 responsible policies.
As a practical matter, whether borrowing countries are more vulnerable to shocks today or not, they are less likely to receive much cooperation from their creditors in . helping to cope with a crisis once it has erupted because individual creditors are more numerous and dispersed with less of a stake in the success of failure of efforts to resolve or contain a financial crisis.
Regardless of where one comes down on the issue of whether capital-importing developing countries are more vulnerable to shocks in today's globalized capital markets, one implication for the recipients of large scale of net capital inflows is that the authorities in these countries will need to pay a good deal more attention than they have in the recent past to potential shocks both external and internal. They will need to develop their O-early warning systems. These SYStemS should differ from and be independent of the early warning systems used .
18. This M a lesson Involving today's global financial ma kets that is far from uni~e to Mexico's situation. It is central to the evaluation of the Ew crises of 1992 and 1993 and the behavior of bond markets in 1994. It is also subject to dispute. In the face of unwanted capital inflows, which was
Mexico's situation in 1992 and 1993, countries face difficult choices. Either fiscal policy should be tightened further even if it involves running a substantial fiscal surplus, or the real exchange rate must be allowed to appreciate, or capital inflows must be sterilized and reserves built up which often has negative fiscal consequences since interest receipts on external reserve holdings are less than interest payments on domestic obligations' or there should be resort to controls on capital inflows, or some combination.
19. Advocates of permanently fixed exchange rates and currencY boards do not appear to have tempered their advocacy by much. 20. William Cline points out in his retrospective look at the debt crises of the 1980s that the flaw in Nigel Lawson's dictum that current account deficits don't matter as long as theY are accompanied by balanced budgets or SUrPIUSeS aPPlles ewallY to developing countries and developed countrles~and he correctlY diagnosed this flaw as applying to the Mexican case well b~fcre the crisis broke. William R. Cline, InternationalDebt " Reexamined, Institute for InternationalEconomics, Washington/ DC, February 1995.
-22-The capital controls 'solution" has attracted an increased amount of favorable attention in some quarters in the 21 aftermath of the Mexican crisis.
However, I am skeptical about this latest turn in internationalmonetary fashion. In many cases, it is only the countries with very sound macroeconomic policies and high domestic savings rates that can afford to limit capital inflows, and even they pay a price by distorting intertemporaldecision making. Even when they do cut themselves off from some kinds of inflows (e.g., short-term borrowing), they are reluctant to cut themselves off from other kinds of flows (e.g., i markets or in the form of trade credits), and once the possibility of allowing some forms of short-term or portfolio capital inflows is opened up, the nature of any ensuing crisis is at most a matter of degree. Moreover, the notion that capital controls are a good idea for developing countries but a bad idea for developed countries runs counter to the truth that at the margin these two groups of countries cannot and should not be distinguished.22
21. See, for example, the 1995 Annual Renort of the Bank for InternationalSettlements, "emerging economies should perhaps be..more prudent in dismantling controls on short term capital inflows," p. Slo. 22. Larry Summers has expressed my bias with his characteristic zing, 'it is clear that we would all rather live in countries in which capital is trying to get in, rather than in countries from which capital is trying to get out. That suggests that coun'ries should be very cautious about imposing capital controls with the objective of discouraging capital inflows.n Remarks at Symposium on Capital F1OWS, Jerusalem, Israel, April 3, 1995. While there has been no observed trend toward increased volatility in those markets for financial assets that have been freely functioning for extended periods of time, for example, the market for U.S. Treasury securities and spot markets among the major currencies, recorded volatility has increased in markets 23. One does not need to go so far as to argue that central bankers are like the little Dutch boy with his finger in th~&ike against the onslaught of stateless money as Steve Solomon dues in his Confidence Game (Simon and Schuster, 1995) to recognize that the international financial system has changed.
-24 -that previously were controlled. Where previously prices were tightly controlled with the result that sharp movements were ruled out or transactions were never consummated, now prices are allowed respond to shocks.
As noted above, the authorities have developmentswith a mixture of fear and awe. Finally there was the risk to the global trend toward market-orientedreforms that had swept the developing world over 24. Based on BIS data, which are not fully comparable for th= two dates, bank claims on non-OPEC developing countries rose from $247 billion in December 1982 to $489 billion in December 1994. Third is the implication for preventative activities.
How best can the international financial community (private sector as well as public sector, including the international 27. This is not a clean distinction because disagreements about nature of the threat were mixed with disagreements about whose responsibility it was to meet any threat. 28. If the reader is not convinced by my assertion, conside I~he debate in early 1995 about how and why the dollar-mark and dollar-yen exchange rates may or may not have been affected by the Mexican peso crisis.
-30 -financial institutions)organize itself in advance to increase the probability that Mexican-type situations either do not arise or do not involve such massive shocks either to the economy of the country directly involved or to the world economy and financial system? Among the elements of better prevention are increased transparency and provision of data to markets as well as the three types of early warning systems that were discussed in Sections II--one each for the recipient country, the market participants, and the official international financial organizations. If prevention fails, financial market distress requires that multilateral institutions and major economies be able to respond where appropriate in a quick and coordinated fashion. Financing mechanisms must operate on a scale and with the timeliness required to manage shocks effectively. In this context we urge the IMF to:
To establish a new standing procedure --'Emergency Financing Mechanism" --which would provide faster access to Fund arrangements with strong conditionality and larger upfront disbursements in crisis situations. support this procedure, we ask: the G-10 and other countries with the capacity to support the system to develop financifigarrangements with the objective of doubling as soon as possible the amount currently available under the GAB [GeneralArrangements to Borrow] to respond to financial emergencies. there is a better way to manage these crises? Such an examination realistically might proceed on the assumption that all crises will not, and perhaps should not, be preventable. The analysis might also assume that there will be a perceived need try to manage a crisis so that it does minimal damage to the to functioning of the international financial system and the world economy; in other words, the option of leaving the country to work out its problems with the market will not be attractive in all circumstances. Finally, the analysis might assume that sufficient external emergency resources may well not be available to handle all such situations. Put this way, the answer to the question of whether there should be a better way to handle these crises obviously is yes. An obvious answer to a complex question Options.
D.
..
